With the Big Ten up to 20 and the SEC landing their preferred candidates to get to 16, the Pac-12 and UT would have to make a deal.
The reality is that there would not be a way to make either the PAC or the Big 12 into a top revenue conference with both conferences keeping their current membership.
The Big 12 is the lesser conference. It would have to go.
It would take a vote of 8 of 10 members to kill the Big 12. In theory, the basis would be the old PAC deal for 16 (UT, Tech, OU, OSU) plus 3-4 more candidates.
Obviously the PAC-12 was prepared to add Kansas as A&M's replacement in their first push for 16, so Kansas is in as the fifth Big 12 school.
I think the A&M departure did a ton to further open Texas recruiting to SEC schools. Dallas/Ft. Worth is a key recruiting territory for UT & OU --- not to mention Tech and OSU. I believe the four felt they absolutely had to add the best "home school" in DFW to remain the "home conference" in DFW and as such protect their recruiting turf.
The four could not afford to see the SEC figure it out and add TCU. OU and UT do not want to see TCU vs. Arkansas or LSU in the Jerry Dome each year fueling SEC recruiting in DFW.
I think this situation would still be potentially in play if TCU was left behind for the SEC, so the PAC would have no choice but to bring them along for the ride.
Now some might think there is no way the PAC would admit a school with religious connections. I do not think that is the case. The evidence that would be presented against my contention is the PAC's balking on Baylor and BYU.
Let's start with the big PAC headache, BYU.
BYU made the institutional choice most religious privates have made, not to heavily pursue research. The PAC-12 and Big Ten have a conference culture that strongly values research. BYU specifically limits research for religious reasons. Regardless of how strong BYU's undergraduate program is, that combo will not fly in the PAC unless all of the PAC's other options are exhausted.
Plus BYU won't play on Sunday, which is an annoyance.
Plus a lot of liberal leaders in the California schools resent the hell out of the LDS church for bringing their money across state lines into California to fund the opposition of the California initiative to legalize gay marriage in California. This appeared to be the LDS church using a California issue to try to score points for their church with mainstream US Christianity. There is a feeling in California that the LDS church made BYU's bed.
Baylor has been frankly religiously odd. They probably reminded the PAC of BYU. (This article, and the thoughful responses to it, are an excellent discussion on why the PAC is probably out on Baylor long term.)
TCU is a little bit of a different creature. Founded by Addison and Randall Clark with "a vision for an institution of higher education that would be Christian in character, but non-sectarian in spirit and intellectually open-minded", TCU is not your average religious school with a Christian word in it's name.
That goal sounds like the kind of religious school that PAC presidents can tolerate. Football is important at TCU. They have fought hard to get back to the big boy's table. If staying there means TCU has to further codify their methods to reflect their founders desire for intellectual open-mindedness (to fit PAC-12 standards), I am thinking that won't be a problem.
Adding TCU would immediately silence all the "PAC is against Christians" talk, so it actually would offer some strong added benefits by effectively underscoring out why BYU and Baylor are not in the PAC. It isn't that they have religious affiliations, it is that their religious beliefs either regularly interfere (or could interfere) with intellectual pursuits.
So that gets the PAC to 18, lands UT, protects the vitality of UT's and OU's football programs, but that only accounts for 6 Big 12 teams. The PAC needs 8 Big 12 votes.
Now it gets really interesting. With two slots left and Baylor, Kansas State, Iowa State, and West Virginia left, which schools does the conference take?
I think it's a no-brainer when you figure in TV, academics, geography, and religious terms, but most fans will hate the answer.
You add Iowa State. Baylor and KState are in markets already owned. West Virginia is far away. Iowa State is AAU and has a state-wide following in Iowa. It may be a state of only 3 Million, but it is fairly wealthy and you wouldn't have that market otherwise. Plus it allows the PAC and Big Ten to have a shared border ---symbolically that is something likely to be appreciated and valued by the traditional Pac-10 leaders.
That is 7 votes. This is where the PAC can get tricky.
At this point Kansas State would be in the driver's seat for the last slot in the conference. The PAC would have little interest in adding Kansas State. I suspect given the quality of Kansas State football, UT would be totally OK with leaving them behind.
If the Pac could somehow come out with an open slot, they could end up with a dramatically stronger conference.
Enter Baylor.
If KSU is added, Baylor would be out. With the conference out of business the Bears would be looking at no future UT generated conference revenue. As it seems the SEC is uninterested in Baylor, the Bears' athletic budget would drop by at least $20 M a year overnight.
It is a very poor position.
Offer them a deal. If Baylor votes to be the 8th vote to torpedo the conference, the PAC will cut them a very sweet deal. If they don't, KSU gets the slot and Baylor gets nothing.
What would such a deal look like? Home and home games against UT, OU, OSU, Tech, and Kansas in all revenue sports at fat rates for the next 20 years. Structure it so Baylor would essentially net say $20M per year from those games (all slushed in from the top of a newly renegotiated PAC TV deal) as an independent. That way Baylor is effectively on the same tier as BYU. That isn't a bad long position for Baylor at all. The PAC can then use it's influence to help keep Baylor and BYU in the D4 mix (along with other friends of the PAC --- ND, Army, and Navy).
This opens another full slot for the PAC-12. Several schools make sense.
Options for the last all sports slot
AAU Missouri would be a strong add as they share history with the SW division, reinforce the idea of the PAC and Big Ten bordering each other, and offer good sports and markets. Missouri football is somewhat reliant on Texas recruiting and Missouri didn't really want to be in the SEC in the first place. Missouri football is currently having a good season. While not the Big Ten, this would be a much more natural home than the SEC.
And the money would be better.
Another option would be Notre Dame. I do not think the Irish would accept a full membership without requiring opponents that would create ridiculous divisions for most of the other schools.
Arkansas would be another option. They really like being in the SEC, but they aren't SEC lifers. This would be an elite academically affiliation with a lot of nearby rivals (unlike the SEC) and plenty of recruiting opportunities in Texas. Arkansas turned Texas recruiting into becoming nationally relevant in football and basketball in the last days of the Southwest Conference. They really haven't matched that in the SEC.
Today, Arkansas isn't thinking about leaving the SEC because the SEC has the better hand. In this scenario, the SEC would not.
(Arkansas used to be UT's #2 rival behind OU. For UT fans, A&M was always #3.)
The University of New Mexico would make a lot of sense too. They were a finalist when the Big 12 was formed. (An alternative plan would have formed a Big 14 with BYU and UNM joining.) They bring an unserved state (even though it is a small population state with little money.) and would serve as a bridge between the eastern PAC-12 schools and Texas Tech.
The addition of UNM could open the door to selling PAC brand in Mexico. (The PAC isn't currently looking at Mexico, but conceptually that is not far off of what I have read of the PAC's plans to develop more revenue streams by selling more merchandise to markets outside of their footprint.)
UNM has been hamstrung in football historically due to the fact that they compete with UTEP and New Mexico State for the limited football talent generated in the low population state of New Mexico. If they were the only school of that trio in a D4 conference, UNM would get the pick of that talent. Playing in this conference with PAC TV money would allow them to easily supplement their New Mexico recruiting with Texas recruits.
It becomes rather easy to see their football becoming competitive. They are an historic basketball power with one of the best winning percentages in the nation and a large, basketball crazy fanbase. The Pitt is one of the great college basketball venues in the US. Give UNM another quality 7 footer from Texas every 2 years and they would be an annual national title threat.
Their academics lag behind most PAC schools, but they do a significant amount of research which the PAC schools appreciate.
Colorado State makes some sense too. They are a pretty good academic school with a great, new, on-campus stadium. They do a lot of research and are currently very competitive in basketball too.
Colorado sees a large portion of their alumnibase move westward into PAC territories. CSU alumni are much more likely to settle in the Denver DMA. CU and CSU in the same conference makes more TV sense than KU and KSU.
If those 5 are out, Rice or Houston would make sense.
AAU Rice would be a great get from the perspective of the California schools. That would give the PAC the two best academic schools in Texas. Rice has a strong baseball program which matters to the California schools. Playing UT, OU, Tech, and OSU would make Rice's football attendance look quite respectable overnight. (Rice's small enrollment has become a huge problem in making their football relevant. One would hope the PAC schools would lay down the law with Rice about increasing enrollment as the cost to get in, but you never know...)
Another option would be to add Houston. Houston draws solid crowds on their own and would likely do much better in this PAC. Houston is a large university actively working to increase their research volume. It would read very well in the state and would serve as a strong platform for PAC recruiting in Houston --- currently lost territory for most of the Big 12 since A&M's departure.
I would think Missouri, UNM, or Arkansas would generate the most value. Lets say Missouri takes the spot.
Finally the PAC could consider adding Rice as an Olympic member. That would create 3 divisions in basketball and the other Olympic sports with UT, Rice, Tech, OU, OSU, Kansas, and either ISU or mystery team (Missouri, Arkansas, UNM, etc.) in a division, ISU (or mystery school), Colorado, Utah, ASU, Arizona, USC, and UCLA in a division and Cal, Stanford, OSU, Oregon, Washington, and WASSU in a division. That would allow the 20 football programs needed for fat TV revenue while potentially cutting travel costs dramatically at all the PAC schools.
Friday, October 18, 2013
How to Count to 60 (...schools in Contract Conferences); Part 2- the SEC cherry picks...
With the Big Ten pulling a number of additional schools (Virginia, UNC, Duke, Georgia Tech, FSU and either Vandy or Miami) the Big Ten schools would be making insane money and the ACC would be dead in the water.
The loss of those ACC schools would have ESPN looking to drop the per team payouts from $17 Million per school. That would have every school looking for a way out.
The Big Ten payouts would likely dwarf other conferences. The Big 12's plan was to try to capture Florida State and Clemson to spike the conference's payouts, but with FSU out of the picture and Big Ten payouts off the chart, joining the dysfunctional Big 12 would not be at the top of any school's list.
The Big Ten's per team payouts would skyrocket causing the SEC and Pac-12 to again look hard at expansion.
The SEC would quickly scoop up North Carolina State and Virginia Tech to get access to those states. In an ideal world that would be all the SEC leaders would want to do. That kind of addition would help their per school payouts, but would not equate to Big Ten money. Keeping up with the Big Ten's money is important to the SEC, but regional play matters to SEC fans. It would be a tough balance to maintain.
Those schools are the easy adds. The tough debates in the SEC are Florida State, Clemson, and Georgia Tech. Those trio of schools allegedly were historically blocked by Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia working together. If FSU and Georgia Tech were off the board, it would be pretty likely that that alliance would collapse and that Clemson would likely find their way in at some point.
If Vanderbilt was lost, the SEC would also be in a tough position. With no private schools in the conference, the SEC would be subject to freedom of information requests. They would not tolerate that, so almost immediately a replacement private school would have to be added.
The SEC as a whole does not appear to be strongly in favor of adding Miami with it's Northeastern attitude, but in such a scenario it could make sense to add a private like Miami to restore their ability to avoid FOI requests and be perceived as a strong add.
Other candidates to replace Vandy as the token private would be Wake Forrest and former SEC member Tulane. While schools like LSU and Florida might balk at the addition of a better academic school from their own state, NC State would likely welcome the addition of another NC school. It is hard to see how the dynamic might unfold.
Tulane may have a lot of "tradition votes" to return. Or maybe not.
For now, we will say Virginia Tech and NC State only in if Vandy stays. Miami, Wake Forest, or Tulane in if they go. I think the SEC would sit at 16 for a year or so to regroup unless someone forced their hand.
The loss of those ACC schools would have ESPN looking to drop the per team payouts from $17 Million per school. That would have every school looking for a way out.
The Big Ten payouts would likely dwarf other conferences. The Big 12's plan was to try to capture Florida State and Clemson to spike the conference's payouts, but with FSU out of the picture and Big Ten payouts off the chart, joining the dysfunctional Big 12 would not be at the top of any school's list.
The Big Ten's per team payouts would skyrocket causing the SEC and Pac-12 to again look hard at expansion.
The SEC would quickly scoop up North Carolina State and Virginia Tech to get access to those states. In an ideal world that would be all the SEC leaders would want to do. That kind of addition would help their per school payouts, but would not equate to Big Ten money. Keeping up with the Big Ten's money is important to the SEC, but regional play matters to SEC fans. It would be a tough balance to maintain.
Those schools are the easy adds. The tough debates in the SEC are Florida State, Clemson, and Georgia Tech. Those trio of schools allegedly were historically blocked by Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia working together. If FSU and Georgia Tech were off the board, it would be pretty likely that that alliance would collapse and that Clemson would likely find their way in at some point.
If Vanderbilt was lost, the SEC would also be in a tough position. With no private schools in the conference, the SEC would be subject to freedom of information requests. They would not tolerate that, so almost immediately a replacement private school would have to be added.
The SEC as a whole does not appear to be strongly in favor of adding Miami with it's Northeastern attitude, but in such a scenario it could make sense to add a private like Miami to restore their ability to avoid FOI requests and be perceived as a strong add.
Other candidates to replace Vandy as the token private would be Wake Forrest and former SEC member Tulane. While schools like LSU and Florida might balk at the addition of a better academic school from their own state, NC State would likely welcome the addition of another NC school. It is hard to see how the dynamic might unfold.
Tulane may have a lot of "tradition votes" to return. Or maybe not.
For now, we will say Virginia Tech and NC State only in if Vandy stays. Miami, Wake Forest, or Tulane in if they go. I think the SEC would sit at 16 for a year or so to regroup unless someone forced their hand.
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
"Is Tony Romo 'clutch' or isn't he?" That kind of misses the point.
Dallas fans tend to blame Tony Romo for all of the team's lack of playoff success in the Romo era. It is a gross oversimplification to be sure, but the rash of recent articles defending Romo as being clutch also miss the point... in my opinion.
Tony Romo is a victim of his own skill set and Jerry Jones blowing his evaluation of Romo.
Let's briefly touch on clutch and then take a deeper look at the previous sentence.
Being a "clutch QB" is a pretty wide ranging concept. Some believe a clutch player is a guy who can bring a team from behind with creative magic and carry a team to a victory. By that definition Tony Romo is certainly a clutch player. He has skills in that regard that match up with the greats --- Elway, Farve, Montana, Staubach, etc.
Some define being a clutch player as not making a mistake that costs a team a win in crunch time. By that definition, guys like Troy Aikman would be considered clutch and guys like Elway, Farve, and Romo (and even our beloved Roger Staubach) might fall off the list.
Romo isn't Montana or Brady. So if your definition of clutch is both, it is a very small list. As Dallas fans, I think it is important to get that.
With no clear shared definition of "clutch" and as multiple superbowl winning QBs would not qualify on either list, the question of whether Romo is clutch or not seems very pointless.
To me, Romo is clearly a good QB who has moments of brilliant play. That should be enough to allow a team to win a superbowl.
So what happens to Romo that leads to these costly late game mistakes? The vast majority of Romo's late game errors seem to originate from two causes:
1) Being asked to do to much.
2) Offensive line breakdowns.
I think both of these situations point back to the core problem of Jerry Jones not understanding what he has in Romo.
Just prior to Tony Romo taking over, Dallas was quarterbacked by Drew Bledsoe. Bledsoe had progressed from "lacking mobility in the pocket" to being statuesque.
Now I love tough QBs who will stand in to make a tough throw, but by time Bledsoe was starting in Dallas he was the equivilant of a punch drunk old heavy weight. He was slow to deliver the ball, had no escapability at all, and had lost his feel for sensing the rush.
Dallas had a mixture of rapidly declining old vets and scrubs signed off the street blocking for him. The result was a mostly open pathway to sacking Bledsoe.
Enter Romo. Romo combined an uncanny knack for sensing the backside rush and buying time with great field vision.
With Romo on the field, suddenly Dallas's offensive line could buy their QB enough time to find an open receiver.
I contend this lead Jerry Jones to believe that his offensive line was better than it was and to believe he can afford to pinch pennies on the Oline because Romo can create his own time. I think Mr. Jones also oddly seemed to believe that all Romo needed to iron out his mistakes was for Jones to back him unconditionally (or maybe Jerry Jones just absolutely needs to have a love-fest with his current QBs.)
Eventually Jason Garrett had to break it to Jones that expensive vets on the Dallas offensive line were not much better than guys off the street and certainly weren't worth the money they were being paid. Jones purged the expensive vets off the line. One has to think that Garrett expected Jones to burn a number of 1st, 2nds, and 3rd round picks on offensive linemen to rebuild the line or sign some top offensive linemen in free agency, but up until the draft day meltdown that lead to the drafting of Travis Fredrick this year, the only OL of note brought in was Tyron Smith.
Instead Jones brought in an undrafted guy rated one of the worst starting OLs in the league the previous season (Nate Livings) and a former 7th rounder Carolina fans nicknamed the turnstile for his inability to reliably pass block (Mackenzy Bernadeau).
Jones' logic clearly seemed to think that new OL coach Bill Callahan would teach these two strong but mistake prone vets not to make as many mistakes and the assumption was clearly that any blown blocks would be covered by Romo scrambles.
This was again a big mistake. Romo can escape an end on the edge, but pressure up the middle is very disruptive to his game. Jones blew the evaluation on Romo there.
Predictably, it didn't work.
Neither did all of Jones's series of "Romo hugs" --- ie. Making the team "Romo friendly", Meddling to give Romo access to play calling, etc. ---- haven't changed who Romo is as a QB.
As Bill Parcells quickly figured out, if you give Romo too much rope, he will hang himself with mistakes. The best Romo is one reined in by a demanding coach. Romo needs to be constantly challenged to play his best.
Today he status quo continues. When Romo feels fat, dumb, and happy his game is sloppy. When Romo feels under fire, he plays disciplined ball and is often brilliant.
Luckily the fans in Dallas are likely to keep the heat on Romo for the rest of his time in Dallas --- overcoming all of Mr. Jones's hugging.
Jones followed up last season's offensive line debacle by not signing any competent free agent guards this offseason. When the Oline feel apart in the pre-season under the weight of injuries and abysmal guard play, Jones was finally forced to lure Brian Waters, a competent guard, out of retirement to prevent a fan rebellion.
It makes one wonder why Jones could not see how poor line play was killing his QB and his team's chances when it was plainly clear to all Cowboy fans.
The answer seems to be rooted in an underestimation of the effect poor line play has on Romo and an overestimation of Romo's ability to overcome it.
Romo has had a crappy OL throughout his career in Dallas. For him to achieve what he has accomplished statistically is really astounding.
And it explains his end of game meltdowns. When a game is on the line, good players dig deep to make plays.
When these players are on the defenses playing Dallas they are going against a tired and at best an average offensive line with several weak spots. Invariably the Dallas OL gets exposed and a worn down Romo gets pressured or sacked adding more pressure to the next play. We have seen it over and over. When the pressure comes next, Romo can't square his feet and get off a good pass, and that's ballgame.
Jerry Jones needs two good starting guards more than an expensive CB, linebacker, or wide receiver.
Hopefully he gets it before Romo's career is over.
Tony Romo is a victim of his own skill set and Jerry Jones blowing his evaluation of Romo.
Let's briefly touch on clutch and then take a deeper look at the previous sentence.
Being a "clutch QB" is a pretty wide ranging concept. Some believe a clutch player is a guy who can bring a team from behind with creative magic and carry a team to a victory. By that definition Tony Romo is certainly a clutch player. He has skills in that regard that match up with the greats --- Elway, Farve, Montana, Staubach, etc.
Some define being a clutch player as not making a mistake that costs a team a win in crunch time. By that definition, guys like Troy Aikman would be considered clutch and guys like Elway, Farve, and Romo (and even our beloved Roger Staubach) might fall off the list.
Romo isn't Montana or Brady. So if your definition of clutch is both, it is a very small list. As Dallas fans, I think it is important to get that.
With no clear shared definition of "clutch" and as multiple superbowl winning QBs would not qualify on either list, the question of whether Romo is clutch or not seems very pointless.
To me, Romo is clearly a good QB who has moments of brilliant play. That should be enough to allow a team to win a superbowl.
So what happens to Romo that leads to these costly late game mistakes? The vast majority of Romo's late game errors seem to originate from two causes:
1) Being asked to do to much.
2) Offensive line breakdowns.
I think both of these situations point back to the core problem of Jerry Jones not understanding what he has in Romo.
Just prior to Tony Romo taking over, Dallas was quarterbacked by Drew Bledsoe. Bledsoe had progressed from "lacking mobility in the pocket" to being statuesque.
Now I love tough QBs who will stand in to make a tough throw, but by time Bledsoe was starting in Dallas he was the equivilant of a punch drunk old heavy weight. He was slow to deliver the ball, had no escapability at all, and had lost his feel for sensing the rush.
Dallas had a mixture of rapidly declining old vets and scrubs signed off the street blocking for him. The result was a mostly open pathway to sacking Bledsoe.
Enter Romo. Romo combined an uncanny knack for sensing the backside rush and buying time with great field vision.
With Romo on the field, suddenly Dallas's offensive line could buy their QB enough time to find an open receiver.
I contend this lead Jerry Jones to believe that his offensive line was better than it was and to believe he can afford to pinch pennies on the Oline because Romo can create his own time. I think Mr. Jones also oddly seemed to believe that all Romo needed to iron out his mistakes was for Jones to back him unconditionally (or maybe Jerry Jones just absolutely needs to have a love-fest with his current QBs.)
Eventually Jason Garrett had to break it to Jones that expensive vets on the Dallas offensive line were not much better than guys off the street and certainly weren't worth the money they were being paid. Jones purged the expensive vets off the line. One has to think that Garrett expected Jones to burn a number of 1st, 2nds, and 3rd round picks on offensive linemen to rebuild the line or sign some top offensive linemen in free agency, but up until the draft day meltdown that lead to the drafting of Travis Fredrick this year, the only OL of note brought in was Tyron Smith.
Instead Jones brought in an undrafted guy rated one of the worst starting OLs in the league the previous season (Nate Livings) and a former 7th rounder Carolina fans nicknamed the turnstile for his inability to reliably pass block (Mackenzy Bernadeau).
Jones' logic clearly seemed to think that new OL coach Bill Callahan would teach these two strong but mistake prone vets not to make as many mistakes and the assumption was clearly that any blown blocks would be covered by Romo scrambles.
This was again a big mistake. Romo can escape an end on the edge, but pressure up the middle is very disruptive to his game. Jones blew the evaluation on Romo there.
Predictably, it didn't work.
Neither did all of Jones's series of "Romo hugs" --- ie. Making the team "Romo friendly", Meddling to give Romo access to play calling, etc. ---- haven't changed who Romo is as a QB.
As Bill Parcells quickly figured out, if you give Romo too much rope, he will hang himself with mistakes. The best Romo is one reined in by a demanding coach. Romo needs to be constantly challenged to play his best.
Today he status quo continues. When Romo feels fat, dumb, and happy his game is sloppy. When Romo feels under fire, he plays disciplined ball and is often brilliant.
Luckily the fans in Dallas are likely to keep the heat on Romo for the rest of his time in Dallas --- overcoming all of Mr. Jones's hugging.
Jones followed up last season's offensive line debacle by not signing any competent free agent guards this offseason. When the Oline feel apart in the pre-season under the weight of injuries and abysmal guard play, Jones was finally forced to lure Brian Waters, a competent guard, out of retirement to prevent a fan rebellion.
It makes one wonder why Jones could not see how poor line play was killing his QB and his team's chances when it was plainly clear to all Cowboy fans.
The answer seems to be rooted in an underestimation of the effect poor line play has on Romo and an overestimation of Romo's ability to overcome it.
Romo has had a crappy OL throughout his career in Dallas. For him to achieve what he has accomplished statistically is really astounding.
And it explains his end of game meltdowns. When a game is on the line, good players dig deep to make plays.
When these players are on the defenses playing Dallas they are going against a tired and at best an average offensive line with several weak spots. Invariably the Dallas OL gets exposed and a worn down Romo gets pressured or sacked adding more pressure to the next play. We have seen it over and over. When the pressure comes next, Romo can't square his feet and get off a good pass, and that's ballgame.
Jerry Jones needs two good starting guards more than an expensive CB, linebacker, or wide receiver.
Hopefully he gets it before Romo's career is over.
Saturday, October 12, 2013
How much is Johnny Football worth to A&M? The answer will surprise you...
I have to open with a disclaimer. I am not a Johnny Football fan. I think Johnny Manzel is a bit of a reckless young dope. Everyone makes mistakes in their early 20's, but he seems to make more than most.
He is a train wreck waiting to happen.
Why do I say this? What pushed me over the edge on Manziel?
Allegedly, Manziel signed a bunch of autographs for pay to buy himself some new rims for his car.
Really.
The guy, who is reportedly from quite a wealthy family, reportedly put his collegiate eligibility at risk to buy rims that allegedly he could have easily bought on his own.
(Manziel and Texas A&M leaders deny it. The NCAA didn't have proof to make it stick, but A&M worked out a deal where Manziel would sit out half of a game --- a mismatch that was decided when it was scheduled --- in exchange for the NCAA never mentioning it again. That strongly suggests there was smoke there --- Way to show "institutional control" A&M... )
It hits me as the latest in a series of incidents that suggest Manziel is problematically immature and that an NFL owner would be silly to put the keys to their franchise in the hands of Johnny Manziel --- regardless of his obvious knack for making plays.
Now all of that said, this autograph scandal scandal really has everyone questioning the justice in the NCAA having rules limiting a student's ability to make money off their athletic fame while in college.
Let's take that and apply it back to Johnny Manziel.
Johnny Manziel may be an NFL flop. History is filled with top collegiate QBs who never get a fair shot in the NFL or get injured in college and never make it to the NFL.
Texas A&M fans are ridiculously football crazy and up until last season had been starved for top level success for decades.
How many A&M fans would have paid $40 for a signed picture of Johnny Manziel after last season? How much money would A&M boosters have paid their football rock star in appearance fees last spring if they were allowed to do so?
It is not out of the question that Manziel might have earned up to or even over a million dollars last year if he had been allowed to sell himself to Aggie fans.
Immature brat or not, I cannot think of a valid reason he should not have been able to earn money off his fame, just like Miley Cyrus or any other entertainer.
What ever that number is, Manziel's unstable behavior has certainly cut into the demand he might get today. (And that doesn't even begin to cover the basic loss of demand resultant from him no longer being "new").
This is in affect a macrocosm of the earning lifespan of your average college football star.
When the iron is hot, only the NCAA and the schools can make money off the player's fame. It isn't right.
Manziel's situation just makes the numbers bigger and easier for a fan to see the injustice of those NCAA rules.
The Manziel autograph scandal in it self is quite interesting. When you link it to the amount of money that was donated to A&M last year it becomes mind-boggling.
Lets look at the link between A&M's football success and their fund raising efforts.
In 2008-09 A&M finished #89 and they received $187 Million in donations from fans and alumni.
In 2009-10, A&M finished #58 and that number was $212 Million.
In 2010-11, A&M finished #20 and that number was $184 Million.
In 2011-12, A&M finished #14 and that number was $181 Million.
Last year Manziel carried A&M to a #3 finish in the final Sagarain rankings --- unheard of recent Aggie history. He single-handedly validated Aggie dreams of what value moving to the SEC might create.
A&M pulled in $740 Million in donations in 2012-13.
To put this into perspective, the top fund raising university in 2012 was California Berkley with $405 Million in donations.
A&M almost doubled that. Just think about that.
There is an argument to be made that Johnny Football may have brought in anywhere from $528 to $559 million dollars to A&M last year.
Again this is similar to dynamics that occur all over college football, just on a much, much larger scale as Aggies love football. Not every alumnibase is as football crazy as A&M's, but there are other ways to see the value football athletes generate for schools.
College athletics is a "loss leader" promotion for universities. Football especially.
When Doug Flutie won the Heisman Trophy, Boston College saw an explosion of applications the following year. It is not inaccurate to say that Flutie's miracle pass expanded enrollment and allowed BC to have a slightly better academic profile among their next few incoming classes. Forgetting all the other doors that opened for BC, that kind of application explosion alone is worth a lot to a university.
Since Wichita State dropped football, they have seen their university growth flatline vs. in state competition Kansas State and Kansas. Dropping football is a decision that viewed to through the lens of history appears very short sighted.
Since Lamar, a university located in football crazy east Texas, reinstated football with an eye on eventual FBS status, they have seen their enrollment grow from 11,000 to over 14,000. A gain of tuition for 3000 students is pretty significant.
Taking it back to A&M and Manziel as it is again a much more glaring example, why should a kid like Manziel be prevented from making $1M (or more) selling himself to rabid football fans when his university appears to have made 500 times that amount last year doing the same.
It stinks.
He is a train wreck waiting to happen.
Why do I say this? What pushed me over the edge on Manziel?
Allegedly, Manziel signed a bunch of autographs for pay to buy himself some new rims for his car.
Really.
The guy, who is reportedly from quite a wealthy family, reportedly put his collegiate eligibility at risk to buy rims that allegedly he could have easily bought on his own.
(Manziel and Texas A&M leaders deny it. The NCAA didn't have proof to make it stick, but A&M worked out a deal where Manziel would sit out half of a game --- a mismatch that was decided when it was scheduled --- in exchange for the NCAA never mentioning it again. That strongly suggests there was smoke there --- Way to show "institutional control" A&M... )
It hits me as the latest in a series of incidents that suggest Manziel is problematically immature and that an NFL owner would be silly to put the keys to their franchise in the hands of Johnny Manziel --- regardless of his obvious knack for making plays.
Now all of that said, this autograph scandal scandal really has everyone questioning the justice in the NCAA having rules limiting a student's ability to make money off their athletic fame while in college.
Let's take that and apply it back to Johnny Manziel.
Johnny Manziel may be an NFL flop. History is filled with top collegiate QBs who never get a fair shot in the NFL or get injured in college and never make it to the NFL.
Texas A&M fans are ridiculously football crazy and up until last season had been starved for top level success for decades.
How many A&M fans would have paid $40 for a signed picture of Johnny Manziel after last season? How much money would A&M boosters have paid their football rock star in appearance fees last spring if they were allowed to do so?
It is not out of the question that Manziel might have earned up to or even over a million dollars last year if he had been allowed to sell himself to Aggie fans.
Immature brat or not, I cannot think of a valid reason he should not have been able to earn money off his fame, just like Miley Cyrus or any other entertainer.
What ever that number is, Manziel's unstable behavior has certainly cut into the demand he might get today. (And that doesn't even begin to cover the basic loss of demand resultant from him no longer being "new").
This is in affect a macrocosm of the earning lifespan of your average college football star.
When the iron is hot, only the NCAA and the schools can make money off the player's fame. It isn't right.
Manziel's situation just makes the numbers bigger and easier for a fan to see the injustice of those NCAA rules.
The Manziel autograph scandal in it self is quite interesting. When you link it to the amount of money that was donated to A&M last year it becomes mind-boggling.
Lets look at the link between A&M's football success and their fund raising efforts.
In 2008-09 A&M finished #89 and they received $187 Million in donations from fans and alumni.
In 2009-10, A&M finished #58 and that number was $212 Million.
In 2010-11, A&M finished #20 and that number was $184 Million.
In 2011-12, A&M finished #14 and that number was $181 Million.
Last year Manziel carried A&M to a #3 finish in the final Sagarain rankings --- unheard of recent Aggie history. He single-handedly validated Aggie dreams of what value moving to the SEC might create.
A&M pulled in $740 Million in donations in 2012-13.
To put this into perspective, the top fund raising university in 2012 was California Berkley with $405 Million in donations.
A&M almost doubled that. Just think about that.
There is an argument to be made that Johnny Football may have brought in anywhere from $528 to $559 million dollars to A&M last year.
Again this is similar to dynamics that occur all over college football, just on a much, much larger scale as Aggies love football. Not every alumnibase is as football crazy as A&M's, but there are other ways to see the value football athletes generate for schools.
College athletics is a "loss leader" promotion for universities. Football especially.
When Doug Flutie won the Heisman Trophy, Boston College saw an explosion of applications the following year. It is not inaccurate to say that Flutie's miracle pass expanded enrollment and allowed BC to have a slightly better academic profile among their next few incoming classes. Forgetting all the other doors that opened for BC, that kind of application explosion alone is worth a lot to a university.
Since Wichita State dropped football, they have seen their university growth flatline vs. in state competition Kansas State and Kansas. Dropping football is a decision that viewed to through the lens of history appears very short sighted.
Since Lamar, a university located in football crazy east Texas, reinstated football with an eye on eventual FBS status, they have seen their enrollment grow from 11,000 to over 14,000. A gain of tuition for 3000 students is pretty significant.
Taking it back to A&M and Manziel as it is again a much more glaring example, why should a kid like Manziel be prevented from making $1M (or more) selling himself to rabid football fans when his university appears to have made 500 times that amount last year doing the same.
It stinks.
Wednesday, September 11, 2013
A strong case made for the University at Buffalo to change their name
New University at Buffalo athletic director Danny White made some noise in July with his rebranding efforts at that university.
The University is officially "The University at Buffalo, The State University of New York" and has historically marketed their sports teams as "The Buffalo Bulls". White is choosing to focus on the "New York" part of the name. He has begun to feature "New York" a brand. He dreams of a day when the university's teams might be commonly known as the "New York Bulls".
In marketing terms this is a great idea, potentially helping expanding the appeal of a weak brand university by changing the brand.
Other universities have tried similar tactics. Division I schools like The University of Memphis, Texas State University, Missouri State University and others have worked to develop more marketable brands.
But they did it differently. They changed the names of the actual institution.
Unfortunately what is being tried in Buffalo is clearly a workaround --- and in that is a little unstable. Really the optimal marketing move would be for the university to tweak their official name to take over the unused "New York State University" brand.
On UBFan.com, a poster by the name of Buffalo Lion very lucidly made the point that if the university made such a move, it would likely strongly improve their chances of securing a Big Ten invite.
On the surface the idea may seem laughable to many, but I think his argument is actually very sound. It is both well made and worth expanding upon.
As it stands today, UB has no shot of getting in. "Buffalo" is far too limited and parochial of a brand for the Big 10 to accept. There is no way to sell that as a peer to Penn State and Ohio State.
A name change to New York State might very well make them a much stronger candidate by eliminating that huge speed bump.
But there are hurdles to such a name change.
The SUNY system
The State of New York has a university system called the "State University of New York" - SUNY - system. There are 13 degree granting campuses in the SUNY system. Four of those are termed university centers -- the universities at Buffalo, Albany, Binghampton, and Stony Brook (on Long Island).
The thought is that Buffalo isn't going to pursue an outright name change because the current Chancellor of the SUNY system, Nancy Zimpher, sees all 13 degree granting campuses as equals and as such would be disinclined to allow one of them any advantage over the others.
"It you know it won't be approved, why try?" Seems to be the current line of thinking
For people who understand the power of a good collegiate brand, it is pretty plain that allowing the University at Buffalo to use the name "New York State University" would be a dramatic upgrade to that university's ability to market itself.
"X State University" is usually the second strongest public university (and occasionally the strongest - ie. Louisiana State, Ohio State) in a state. In that, the naming convention carries easy connotations to sports fans and the general public.
To people outside of New York, unfamiliar with the universities in New York State, the assumption would be that this renamed UB would be a big deal in the state, second only to New York University. For those in that crowd who understand that NYU is a private school, they would accurately recognize that this renamed UB would be the New York equivalent of Penn State --- with NYU mirroring Ivy League school Penn.
That is exactly the understanding that would resonate with Big Ten supporters, making a dip down for a less developed athletic program potentially politically tolerable in Big Ten circles.
The trouble is that it would also give UB an SUNY approved advantage over the other 12 SUNY degree granting campuses and specifically over the other 3 university centers.
That is however, not a strong enough reason to say no.
Zimpher is a graduate of Ohio State and presumably as such is fully aware of the benefits being part of the CIC could generate.
She has however had to step in as head of the SUNY system and deal with a gross abuse of power in a grade changing scandal at the athletic program at Binghampton, one of the university centers. That scandal saw the president of that university retire, the athletic director resign, and the head basketball coach dismissed. It lead to the SUNY system refocusing to ensure that athletic success remains secondary to academic success.
One can understand if the idea of helping a university's athletic program grow seems very much against her instincts.
But that view of the idea of Buffalo joining the Big 10 is very much an oversimplification. The benefits of this are not primarily athletic in nature.
What would UB be athletically in the Big 10 if admitted? For the next 10-15 years, as the school ramped up it's facilities, they would likely be just another program in the Big 10. They would likely be hard pressed to make a bowl game in football or make the NCAA tournament in basketball most years until their facilities and fan support caught up with their competition.
Perhaps recruiting could dramatically improve as UB transitioned (especially in basketball), but one would think the likely end result for a New York State University in the Big Ten over the next 20 years would be a program the caliber of Purdue, Illinois, Indiana, or Northwestern.
The real benefit would be academic. Anything that is good for UB could easily be good for the other SUNY schools. One would think an academic would see many ways to leverage a SUNY school's admission to the CIC. (Perhaps she could request the additional admission of Stony Brook --- another SUNY AAU member --- into the CIC?)
Having the CIC's lobbying effort pumping federal research dollars into UB (and potentially all four university centers) would be a big net academic gain for students in the SUNY system. And that is the point of her job, isn't it?
Blocking UB amounts to Zimpher cutting off the SUNY system's nose to spite it's face.
The needs of the city
The city has struggled to retain citizens in the face of economic troubles. Since the bills were founded in the 1960's, the city has lost over half of it's population. In the last decade alone one can see the troubles facing Buffalo. The city lost over 10% of its population between the 2000 and 2010 censuses.
That's a bad trend for an NFL city.
Sooner or later Buffalo will lose the Bills. Ralph Wilson is 94. The next owner of the Bills may not feel any need to pass on Los Angeles or a brand new stadium in the Inland Empire to continue to serve a much smaller and poorer community in Western New York.
That is, unfortunately, the national identity of Buffalo. "The city most likely to lose their NFL team due to population erosion."
Having "Buffalo" in your name is not a strong position for a university. UB fans like the city name in the title and enjoy how "The Buffalo Bulls" mirror "The Buffalo Bills", but keeping the name is not a net positive for the city.
Even if the university isn't commonly known as "Buffalo" and doesn't have Buffalo in it's name --- it's still going to be located in Buffalo!
The city will still benefit from all the high paying jobs it creates. The city will still benefit from all the people the university brings in.
So really the question is "What name would bring in more money?"
It may sting the heart of a proud Buffalo resident, but dumping Buffalo from the name could very well rev up the university's ability to rebuild the city.
If (and when) the Bills leave, it would be very reasonable to imagine Bills fans switching their support to the Bulls, if the Bulls are in a conference like the Big 10. That would largely validate the school's admission among Big 10 power brokers and could in turn transform the football program into a strong lure for even more students.
Consider the similarities between Austin and Buffalo. Buffalo may be small for an NFL team, but should they lose the Bills, it is the perfect size to support a major college athletic program. Buffalo will never attract another NBA team, but they could fill a Big 10 basketball arena.
Principles in the City of Buffalo need to be thinking about re-branding the city for the post Bills-era. Being host to a Big 10 school would be a great transition. Mayor Byron Brown and other influential Buffalo residents should be joining former Buffalo Sabres owner Tom Golisano in pushing school officials to push the SUNY system to allow UB to adopt the "New York State" name.
(A few years ago, Golisano reportedly offered to give the university $8 million if they changed their name to New York State. The gift was conditional reportedly because Golisano felt his money would not have the desired impact without the much better New York State name opening doors for the university.)
Never be scared to try to be great
I think the best move for Nancy Zimpher is not just to allow UB's personnel to change the university name, but rather to strongly encourage them to change their name and more, to do so immediately.
Buffalo Lion has is exactly right.
The parochial sound of the "University at Buffalo" will prevent that university from ever gaining consideration for Big 10 admission. It effectively takes UB off the board as a candidate. In very simple terms, regardless of the financial benefits of such an admission, there would be no way for the Big Ten leadership to sell it to their rich alumni boosters.
None of those people want to talk with SEC and Pac-10 boosters about admitting an athletically under performing "city" university --- from the MAC, of all places.
Changing the name to specifically "New York State University" (no reference to Buffalo) in effect puts all of the SUNY systems's cards on the table and dares the Big 10 to pass.
It sets an expectation of an unlimited future for that university. That is something Big 10 boosters can accept and talk about without embarassment. "It is not just about money, NYSU is stepping up, just like Rutgers." They can say when challenged by SEC and Pac-12 alumni.
At that point, the negatives become largely irrelevant.
Attendance
In such a scenario, the fact that UB athletics do not draw Big 10-type numbers seems temporary. Being in the Big 10 will create masses of UB fans and curiosity viewers in Buffalo. Additionally, Buffalo is very close to historic Big 10 territory and would see much stronger turnouts in conference play, fueled by Big 10 alumni in western New York.
Non-competitive Football
On the football field NYSU might be slow to develop, but the kinds of athletic payouts the Big Ten Network would potentially create ($30-45 Million annually per school) could fund major facility upgrades and speed up the development of that program into a bowl caliber one. And, if the Bills do leave, UB athletics would likely inherit NFL caliber facilities.
Non-competitive Basketball
Basketball would likely respond quite quickly. New York City is one of the premiere basketball talent hotbeds in the nation, Bobby Hurley is a well known guy, and with only 5 players on the court, one star can make a program. A single year's Big 10 share could transform basketball at the university.
What does it matter if NYSU is strong in basketball and weak in football in the Big 10? It doesn't.
At that point, it boils down to some simple questions.
Changing UB's name makes the decision a financial one for the Big 10.
Does the big 10 want another school that can potentially generate games in or relevant to New York City AND New York State viewers?
Does the Big 10 want in state cable payouts from a state of 20 Million?
Does the CIC want NY's huge number of congressmen pushing research dollars their way? Do they want another AAU school (or two) in their voting bloc?
The admission of the university (along with a strong football school to balance it) actually becomes quite a compelling argument. One hopes Chancellor Zimpher, the people of Buffalo, and other principles on the UB side see the potential there.
The University is officially "The University at Buffalo, The State University of New York" and has historically marketed their sports teams as "The Buffalo Bulls". White is choosing to focus on the "New York" part of the name. He has begun to feature "New York" a brand. He dreams of a day when the university's teams might be commonly known as the "New York Bulls".
In marketing terms this is a great idea, potentially helping expanding the appeal of a weak brand university by changing the brand.
Other universities have tried similar tactics. Division I schools like The University of Memphis, Texas State University, Missouri State University and others have worked to develop more marketable brands.
But they did it differently. They changed the names of the actual institution.
Unfortunately what is being tried in Buffalo is clearly a workaround --- and in that is a little unstable. Really the optimal marketing move would be for the university to tweak their official name to take over the unused "New York State University" brand.
On UBFan.com, a poster by the name of Buffalo Lion very lucidly made the point that if the university made such a move, it would likely strongly improve their chances of securing a Big Ten invite.
On the surface the idea may seem laughable to many, but I think his argument is actually very sound. It is both well made and worth expanding upon.
As it stands today, UB has no shot of getting in. "Buffalo" is far too limited and parochial of a brand for the Big 10 to accept. There is no way to sell that as a peer to Penn State and Ohio State.
A name change to New York State might very well make them a much stronger candidate by eliminating that huge speed bump.
But there are hurdles to such a name change.
The SUNY system
The State of New York has a university system called the "State University of New York" - SUNY - system. There are 13 degree granting campuses in the SUNY system. Four of those are termed university centers -- the universities at Buffalo, Albany, Binghampton, and Stony Brook (on Long Island).
The thought is that Buffalo isn't going to pursue an outright name change because the current Chancellor of the SUNY system, Nancy Zimpher, sees all 13 degree granting campuses as equals and as such would be disinclined to allow one of them any advantage over the others.
"It you know it won't be approved, why try?" Seems to be the current line of thinking
For people who understand the power of a good collegiate brand, it is pretty plain that allowing the University at Buffalo to use the name "New York State University" would be a dramatic upgrade to that university's ability to market itself.
"X State University" is usually the second strongest public university (and occasionally the strongest - ie. Louisiana State, Ohio State) in a state. In that, the naming convention carries easy connotations to sports fans and the general public.
To people outside of New York, unfamiliar with the universities in New York State, the assumption would be that this renamed UB would be a big deal in the state, second only to New York University. For those in that crowd who understand that NYU is a private school, they would accurately recognize that this renamed UB would be the New York equivalent of Penn State --- with NYU mirroring Ivy League school Penn.
That is exactly the understanding that would resonate with Big Ten supporters, making a dip down for a less developed athletic program potentially politically tolerable in Big Ten circles.
The trouble is that it would also give UB an SUNY approved advantage over the other 12 SUNY degree granting campuses and specifically over the other 3 university centers.
That is however, not a strong enough reason to say no.
Zimpher is a graduate of Ohio State and presumably as such is fully aware of the benefits being part of the CIC could generate.
She has however had to step in as head of the SUNY system and deal with a gross abuse of power in a grade changing scandal at the athletic program at Binghampton, one of the university centers. That scandal saw the president of that university retire, the athletic director resign, and the head basketball coach dismissed. It lead to the SUNY system refocusing to ensure that athletic success remains secondary to academic success.
One can understand if the idea of helping a university's athletic program grow seems very much against her instincts.
But that view of the idea of Buffalo joining the Big 10 is very much an oversimplification. The benefits of this are not primarily athletic in nature.
What would UB be athletically in the Big 10 if admitted? For the next 10-15 years, as the school ramped up it's facilities, they would likely be just another program in the Big 10. They would likely be hard pressed to make a bowl game in football or make the NCAA tournament in basketball most years until their facilities and fan support caught up with their competition.
Perhaps recruiting could dramatically improve as UB transitioned (especially in basketball), but one would think the likely end result for a New York State University in the Big Ten over the next 20 years would be a program the caliber of Purdue, Illinois, Indiana, or Northwestern.
The real benefit would be academic. Anything that is good for UB could easily be good for the other SUNY schools. One would think an academic would see many ways to leverage a SUNY school's admission to the CIC. (Perhaps she could request the additional admission of Stony Brook --- another SUNY AAU member --- into the CIC?)
Having the CIC's lobbying effort pumping federal research dollars into UB (and potentially all four university centers) would be a big net academic gain for students in the SUNY system. And that is the point of her job, isn't it?
Blocking UB amounts to Zimpher cutting off the SUNY system's nose to spite it's face.
The needs of the city
The city has struggled to retain citizens in the face of economic troubles. Since the bills were founded in the 1960's, the city has lost over half of it's population. In the last decade alone one can see the troubles facing Buffalo. The city lost over 10% of its population between the 2000 and 2010 censuses.
That's a bad trend for an NFL city.
Sooner or later Buffalo will lose the Bills. Ralph Wilson is 94. The next owner of the Bills may not feel any need to pass on Los Angeles or a brand new stadium in the Inland Empire to continue to serve a much smaller and poorer community in Western New York.
That is, unfortunately, the national identity of Buffalo. "The city most likely to lose their NFL team due to population erosion."
Having "Buffalo" in your name is not a strong position for a university. UB fans like the city name in the title and enjoy how "The Buffalo Bulls" mirror "The Buffalo Bills", but keeping the name is not a net positive for the city.
Even if the university isn't commonly known as "Buffalo" and doesn't have Buffalo in it's name --- it's still going to be located in Buffalo!
The city will still benefit from all the high paying jobs it creates. The city will still benefit from all the people the university brings in.
So really the question is "What name would bring in more money?"
It may sting the heart of a proud Buffalo resident, but dumping Buffalo from the name could very well rev up the university's ability to rebuild the city.
If (and when) the Bills leave, it would be very reasonable to imagine Bills fans switching their support to the Bulls, if the Bulls are in a conference like the Big 10. That would largely validate the school's admission among Big 10 power brokers and could in turn transform the football program into a strong lure for even more students.
Consider the similarities between Austin and Buffalo. Buffalo may be small for an NFL team, but should they lose the Bills, it is the perfect size to support a major college athletic program. Buffalo will never attract another NBA team, but they could fill a Big 10 basketball arena.
Principles in the City of Buffalo need to be thinking about re-branding the city for the post Bills-era. Being host to a Big 10 school would be a great transition. Mayor Byron Brown and other influential Buffalo residents should be joining former Buffalo Sabres owner Tom Golisano in pushing school officials to push the SUNY system to allow UB to adopt the "New York State" name.
(A few years ago, Golisano reportedly offered to give the university $8 million if they changed their name to New York State. The gift was conditional reportedly because Golisano felt his money would not have the desired impact without the much better New York State name opening doors for the university.)
Never be scared to try to be great
I think the best move for Nancy Zimpher is not just to allow UB's personnel to change the university name, but rather to strongly encourage them to change their name and more, to do so immediately.
Buffalo Lion has is exactly right.
The parochial sound of the "University at Buffalo" will prevent that university from ever gaining consideration for Big 10 admission. It effectively takes UB off the board as a candidate. In very simple terms, regardless of the financial benefits of such an admission, there would be no way for the Big Ten leadership to sell it to their rich alumni boosters.
None of those people want to talk with SEC and Pac-10 boosters about admitting an athletically under performing "city" university --- from the MAC, of all places.
Changing the name to specifically "New York State University" (no reference to Buffalo) in effect puts all of the SUNY systems's cards on the table and dares the Big 10 to pass.
It sets an expectation of an unlimited future for that university. That is something Big 10 boosters can accept and talk about without embarassment. "It is not just about money, NYSU is stepping up, just like Rutgers." They can say when challenged by SEC and Pac-12 alumni.
At that point, the negatives become largely irrelevant.
Attendance
In such a scenario, the fact that UB athletics do not draw Big 10-type numbers seems temporary. Being in the Big 10 will create masses of UB fans and curiosity viewers in Buffalo. Additionally, Buffalo is very close to historic Big 10 territory and would see much stronger turnouts in conference play, fueled by Big 10 alumni in western New York.
Non-competitive Football
On the football field NYSU might be slow to develop, but the kinds of athletic payouts the Big Ten Network would potentially create ($30-45 Million annually per school) could fund major facility upgrades and speed up the development of that program into a bowl caliber one. And, if the Bills do leave, UB athletics would likely inherit NFL caliber facilities.
Non-competitive Basketball
Basketball would likely respond quite quickly. New York City is one of the premiere basketball talent hotbeds in the nation, Bobby Hurley is a well known guy, and with only 5 players on the court, one star can make a program. A single year's Big 10 share could transform basketball at the university.
What does it matter if NYSU is strong in basketball and weak in football in the Big 10? It doesn't.
At that point, it boils down to some simple questions.
Changing UB's name makes the decision a financial one for the Big 10.
Does the big 10 want another school that can potentially generate games in or relevant to New York City AND New York State viewers?
Does the Big 10 want in state cable payouts from a state of 20 Million?
Does the CIC want NY's huge number of congressmen pushing research dollars their way? Do they want another AAU school (or two) in their voting bloc?
The admission of the university (along with a strong football school to balance it) actually becomes quite a compelling argument. One hopes Chancellor Zimpher, the people of Buffalo, and other principles on the UB side see the potential there.
Why I think the Cowboys picked Travis Frederick in the First round and how it affected the rest of the draft...
News reports from the Dallas papers filled in much of the story behind the Dallas Cowboys' selection of Wisconsin C/G Travis Frederick in the first round of the 2013 NFL draft, and I think I have been able to fill in some of the last remaining holes. What emerges seems like a story worth telling....
After blowing the signing of Tony Romo and missing out on most of the 2013 free agent pool, Jerry Jones needed an offensive lineman to sell a distrusting fan base.
In a nutshell, that was the biggest part of it. But the devil is in the details.
You have to understand the situation. Dallas Fans were furious because DT Sharriff Floyd was on the board when Dallas's turn came up at 1(18) and Dallas passed. Dallas had two huge trouble areas entering the draft --- a DT and interior offensive linemen.
Dallas's scouting department appeared to a man to be enraged over Jerry Jones passing on a talent in Floyd ranked between #6 and #8 on the draft board the scouting department assembled.
Jones has said he asked new Defensive Coordinator Monte Kiffin if the team needed to draft Floyd and Kiffen said the team was OK on the DL.
With that in mind, Mr. Jones began looking at offensive linemen.
There are reports that he had his eyes on OL Justin Pugh who went early at 1(19) to the Giants. It is also very possible that Dallas also had OL Kyle Long in their sights. They brought him in for a workout. He went next at 1(20) to Chicago. Both players were considered end of first round, start of second round talents.
Dallas went from having a pick they could use to take what their scouting department considered to be a top 6-8 player, to having all of their first round grade starting offensive linemen off the board. The scouting department was livid. From their perspective, GMs should trust their draft board. When they don't, disasters like this occur.
Jerry Jones simply could not face his fan base with a first round Safety or LB after blowing Floyd, Pugh, and Long. Jones could not just draft the best player available at 30 knowing that it might mean he would not land a starting caliber player on either line in this draft.
There was only one more player Dallas's scouting department considered a first year starter on a pro offensive line --- Travis Frederick.
Frederick was a player some teams loved and others hated. He is aggressive, strong, and well coached. He was a very accomplished collegiate player, but his final year was not as good as previous years as his teammates were not as good as in prior years.
In question among the scouts was his athleticism. Most teams felt he simply lacked the mobility and athleticism to start in the NFL. Dallas's scouting department and a few others disagreed. Dallas actually sent OL coach Bill Callahan, a coach widely considered to have a great eye for OL talent, up to personally work Frederick out.
Most teams looked at Frederick as a gamble to take in the third or fourth round. The teams that thought he had the athleticism to start --- like Dallas --- thought that if a team fell in love with him, Fredrick could go off the board early in the second round. (Dallas actually had him ranked around 25-27 on their draftable players board. Given the run on OL that saw Pugh and Long go about 10 picks earlier than Jones thought, Jones likely felt he had to take Fredrick at 30 to get him at all --- and to appease an angry fan base.)
To state it more bluntly, the teams that thought he was athletic enough saw him as a first year starter, a career-long solid starter, and likely a 10+ year vet. That player is worth a late #1 or early #2. The teams that felt he lacked the athleticism to handle NFL defenders considered him a player that would likely be picked as a gamble in the fourth round. Prior to the draft, the latter camp's opinion was considered much more likely.
I like the Frederick pick instead of Floyd for a few reasons. First a number of scouting reports on Floyd mention that for a top player who is capable of being quite disruptive, Floyd spent a lot of time on his back. To me, that is a concern at DT.
Secondly, a number of teams found a reason to pass on Floyd, not just Dallas. That suggests he has flaws that the pre-draft reports may have discounted too much.
Thirdly, Floyd does not appear to generate many sacks. Some may call that nit picking as he is clearly disruptive, but to me I think you do better with top DTs who have the burst at the end and the hand strength to complete a sack. To me personally, you have to have that if I am going to burn a first on you.
Fourth, the bust rate of top DT prospects is quite a bit higher than the bust rate on OLs.
Finally, I think it makes a lot of sense to listen to your coaching staff. You could have the best prospect in the world, but if your coaching staff won't play him, why bother drafting him?
It may piss off the scouting department, but a balance between the scouting department's and the coaching department's opinions should mean you get a talented prospect that the coaching staff will play.
Dallas under jones has drafted a number of well considered prospects who the coaches had no interest in playing. Bravo to Mr. Jones for trying to address that.
Frederick was given the thumbs up by both groups.
From what I have seen I think Fredrick does have the athleticism to be an above average NFL starter, but there is no denying that the pick that wasn't made seems to have driven the pick that was.
And there were more implications from passing on Floyd. As the news of anger in the scouting department broke, it appears Jones may have tightly followed his board in the second round to appease his scouting department. Gavin Escobar was ranked in that 26-28 range on the Cowboys board, but he screams of being yet another Cowboys' 2nd round TE prospect likely to become a starter at his next NFL stop.
Escobar is physically weak and that makes him a very poor blocker. He needs a good 2 years of weight room work to fix that. While it is very reasonable to think he may be Jason Witten's replacement down the road, it seems pretty debateable that this was a guy the coaches of a team with holes in the starting lineup wanted in the second round.
The NFL is not big on developing prospects over 3+ years.
Then in the third round the Cowboys took Baylor WR Terrance Williams at 3(74) and Georgia Southern S JJ Wilcox. After the Wilcox pick the Dallas coaches were euphoric, voicing great relief that Wilcox, the guy they wanted, was still there.
I found that curious at the time. If they liked Wilcox so much, why not take him at 74? Wilcox was considered a raw 4th round prospect, but on draft day the media was reporting that a number of teams thought highly of him. It is possible other teams could have also thought of taking him in the third round.
It is very possible that Jones took Williams --- a WR some had with a first round grade --- first, so that anyone who would evaluate the trade down would have to say Dallas got an early second round talent and a first round talent back in that trade, rather than an early second round talent and a fourth round talent.
It is also very possible that the pick was again made to appease the Cowboys' scouting department, who likewise had Williams with Escobar in that 26-28 range.
It is certainly interesting to think of how a guy Monte Kiffin didn't want may have driven the course of this draft..
After blowing the signing of Tony Romo and missing out on most of the 2013 free agent pool, Jerry Jones needed an offensive lineman to sell a distrusting fan base.
In a nutshell, that was the biggest part of it. But the devil is in the details.
You have to understand the situation. Dallas Fans were furious because DT Sharriff Floyd was on the board when Dallas's turn came up at 1(18) and Dallas passed. Dallas had two huge trouble areas entering the draft --- a DT and interior offensive linemen.
Dallas's scouting department appeared to a man to be enraged over Jerry Jones passing on a talent in Floyd ranked between #6 and #8 on the draft board the scouting department assembled.
Jones has said he asked new Defensive Coordinator Monte Kiffin if the team needed to draft Floyd and Kiffen said the team was OK on the DL.
With that in mind, Mr. Jones began looking at offensive linemen.
There are reports that he had his eyes on OL Justin Pugh who went early at 1(19) to the Giants. It is also very possible that Dallas also had OL Kyle Long in their sights. They brought him in for a workout. He went next at 1(20) to Chicago. Both players were considered end of first round, start of second round talents.
Dallas went from having a pick they could use to take what their scouting department considered to be a top 6-8 player, to having all of their first round grade starting offensive linemen off the board. The scouting department was livid. From their perspective, GMs should trust their draft board. When they don't, disasters like this occur.
Jerry Jones simply could not face his fan base with a first round Safety or LB after blowing Floyd, Pugh, and Long. Jones could not just draft the best player available at 30 knowing that it might mean he would not land a starting caliber player on either line in this draft.
There was only one more player Dallas's scouting department considered a first year starter on a pro offensive line --- Travis Frederick.
Frederick was a player some teams loved and others hated. He is aggressive, strong, and well coached. He was a very accomplished collegiate player, but his final year was not as good as previous years as his teammates were not as good as in prior years.
In question among the scouts was his athleticism. Most teams felt he simply lacked the mobility and athleticism to start in the NFL. Dallas's scouting department and a few others disagreed. Dallas actually sent OL coach Bill Callahan, a coach widely considered to have a great eye for OL talent, up to personally work Frederick out.
Most teams looked at Frederick as a gamble to take in the third or fourth round. The teams that thought he had the athleticism to start --- like Dallas --- thought that if a team fell in love with him, Fredrick could go off the board early in the second round. (Dallas actually had him ranked around 25-27 on their draftable players board. Given the run on OL that saw Pugh and Long go about 10 picks earlier than Jones thought, Jones likely felt he had to take Fredrick at 30 to get him at all --- and to appease an angry fan base.)
To state it more bluntly, the teams that thought he was athletic enough saw him as a first year starter, a career-long solid starter, and likely a 10+ year vet. That player is worth a late #1 or early #2. The teams that felt he lacked the athleticism to handle NFL defenders considered him a player that would likely be picked as a gamble in the fourth round. Prior to the draft, the latter camp's opinion was considered much more likely.
I like the Frederick pick instead of Floyd for a few reasons. First a number of scouting reports on Floyd mention that for a top player who is capable of being quite disruptive, Floyd spent a lot of time on his back. To me, that is a concern at DT.
Secondly, a number of teams found a reason to pass on Floyd, not just Dallas. That suggests he has flaws that the pre-draft reports may have discounted too much.
Thirdly, Floyd does not appear to generate many sacks. Some may call that nit picking as he is clearly disruptive, but to me I think you do better with top DTs who have the burst at the end and the hand strength to complete a sack. To me personally, you have to have that if I am going to burn a first on you.
Fourth, the bust rate of top DT prospects is quite a bit higher than the bust rate on OLs.
Finally, I think it makes a lot of sense to listen to your coaching staff. You could have the best prospect in the world, but if your coaching staff won't play him, why bother drafting him?
It may piss off the scouting department, but a balance between the scouting department's and the coaching department's opinions should mean you get a talented prospect that the coaching staff will play.
Dallas under jones has drafted a number of well considered prospects who the coaches had no interest in playing. Bravo to Mr. Jones for trying to address that.
Frederick was given the thumbs up by both groups.
From what I have seen I think Fredrick does have the athleticism to be an above average NFL starter, but there is no denying that the pick that wasn't made seems to have driven the pick that was.
And there were more implications from passing on Floyd. As the news of anger in the scouting department broke, it appears Jones may have tightly followed his board in the second round to appease his scouting department. Gavin Escobar was ranked in that 26-28 range on the Cowboys board, but he screams of being yet another Cowboys' 2nd round TE prospect likely to become a starter at his next NFL stop.
Escobar is physically weak and that makes him a very poor blocker. He needs a good 2 years of weight room work to fix that. While it is very reasonable to think he may be Jason Witten's replacement down the road, it seems pretty debateable that this was a guy the coaches of a team with holes in the starting lineup wanted in the second round.
The NFL is not big on developing prospects over 3+ years.
Then in the third round the Cowboys took Baylor WR Terrance Williams at 3(74) and Georgia Southern S JJ Wilcox. After the Wilcox pick the Dallas coaches were euphoric, voicing great relief that Wilcox, the guy they wanted, was still there.
I found that curious at the time. If they liked Wilcox so much, why not take him at 74? Wilcox was considered a raw 4th round prospect, but on draft day the media was reporting that a number of teams thought highly of him. It is possible other teams could have also thought of taking him in the third round.
It is very possible that Jones took Williams --- a WR some had with a first round grade --- first, so that anyone who would evaluate the trade down would have to say Dallas got an early second round talent and a first round talent back in that trade, rather than an early second round talent and a fourth round talent.
It is also very possible that the pick was again made to appease the Cowboys' scouting department, who likewise had Williams with Escobar in that 26-28 range.
It is certainly interesting to think of how a guy Monte Kiffin didn't want may have driven the course of this draft..
Thursday, August 8, 2013
New USFL D.O.A.? Jaime Cuadra admits to embezzling funds for the league...
In a blow to the chances of "The New USFL", Jaime Cuadra --- the faceman for fledgling football league --- has admitted to embezzling funds from his former employer to fund his recruiting efforts for owners to build the new league. Susan Schroeder of UTSanDiego.com wrote:
While I was not thrilled at the idea of a minor league using the USFL name, I find this story sad on several levels.
I would not be surprised to hear sometime in a few months that the league --- minus Cuadra's stolen money --- implodes within their first year, or even before they ever play a game. I am not happy about that at all. Leagues failing that quickly discourage investors in future leagues.
I still firmly believe that today there is a tremendous opportunity to compete with the NFL at limited costs. I think there is a clear pathway for a competing professional football league to develop at reasonable costs to a handful of brave owners.
So if there is a clear pathway, why did the UFL fail and why am I so down on the New USFL's chances?
With apologies to both groups, I don't think either the UFL or the New USFL group has worked from a what I see as a viable vision. The UFL opened with the idea of owners investing $30 Million up front and then paying for a $20 Million dollar roster. That likely seemed far to rich of a cost for a business with the survival rates of upstart pro football leagues. I think they scared away all but the super-rich billionaire potential owners.
When the owners did not appear, the UFL flipped to the idea of being a minor league that fed players to the NFL. To my outsider's view, it appeared that the UFL's initial owners had big money invested for a minor league. I wonder if, for that reason, the buy in costs were kept too high to attract new owners for the uninspiring product that was the UFL.
The New USFL' s initial vision is (was?) the other extreme with a $1 million buy in and a "committment" to spend $6.5 million more. I think most targeted businessmen may have questions about the ability of this plan to yield viable investments.
So what do I think it would take to build a viable start-up league?
Well to start, I believe the toughest bottleneck to get by is locating enough quality owners. I think ideally 12 owners/ownership groups are needed to start a pro football league that will survive. (Potentially it could work with as few as eight, but I strongly suspect the odds of success would decrease a fair amount for each team below 12.)
Spit balling it, given the losses seen by teams in the original USFL (adjusted for today's dollars), you probably need owners who are willing to put up about $10 Million to buy in and potentially lose as much as $30 Million dollars on their teams in operating costs over the 4-5 year period before the teams and the league start to stabilize. (This is obviously a "quick and dirty" educated guess.)
I'd think it would be tough finding 8-12 spring football advocates willing to potentially light $30-$40 million on fire on a gamble.
There is a sales pitch that might work, though. A successful league built upon those lines IMO, would have a chance for those owners to end up with a stable pro team in a stable spring league worth $200-$400M (say 25-40% of an NFL team's value) within about ten years.
While that's a nice return that could be sold to investors, it is still a tough sale as the startup costs are big and as the original USFL proved as few as 1-2 crappy owners (like the original league's J. William Oldenburg, Eddie Einhorn, and Donald Trump proved) can skunk everyone else's efforts and kill the league --- even if the other owners do almost everything right!
With that in mind, I would think you'd be looking for owners (or ownership groups) who are rich, but not Donald Trump or Mark Cuban rich. I am thinking people or groups with net worths in the $350-800 million range. Rich enough to afford the expense; Poor enough to feel a real need to make it work and to religiously stay within the league's financial structure.
And that is the trouble with the new USFL failing quickly. A quick failure of another "competing league" only shrinks that pool of potential investors.
"SAN DIEGO — A former San Diego business executive pleaded guilty Monday to embezzling more than $1 million from two local companies and using the money primarily to fund a fledgling professional football league, federal officials said.The defendant, Jaime Cuadra, 54, was former chief financial officer of Oceanic Enterprises Inc. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud and filing a false federal income tax return in connection with the embezzlement from Oceanic and its parent company, Umami Sustainable Seafood Inc., U.S. Attorney Laura E. Duffy said in a statement.Federal documents do not name the league, but in 2012 Cuadra said he had acquired the United States Football League brand.....
In court documents, Cuadra admitted that he used the embezzled funds to attract league investors and pay league executives and marketing and public relations fees...."
While I was not thrilled at the idea of a minor league using the USFL name, I find this story sad on several levels.
I would not be surprised to hear sometime in a few months that the league --- minus Cuadra's stolen money --- implodes within their first year, or even before they ever play a game. I am not happy about that at all. Leagues failing that quickly discourage investors in future leagues.
I still firmly believe that today there is a tremendous opportunity to compete with the NFL at limited costs. I think there is a clear pathway for a competing professional football league to develop at reasonable costs to a handful of brave owners.
So if there is a clear pathway, why did the UFL fail and why am I so down on the New USFL's chances?
With apologies to both groups, I don't think either the UFL or the New USFL group has worked from a what I see as a viable vision. The UFL opened with the idea of owners investing $30 Million up front and then paying for a $20 Million dollar roster. That likely seemed far to rich of a cost for a business with the survival rates of upstart pro football leagues. I think they scared away all but the super-rich billionaire potential owners.
When the owners did not appear, the UFL flipped to the idea of being a minor league that fed players to the NFL. To my outsider's view, it appeared that the UFL's initial owners had big money invested for a minor league. I wonder if, for that reason, the buy in costs were kept too high to attract new owners for the uninspiring product that was the UFL.
The New USFL' s initial vision is (was?) the other extreme with a $1 million buy in and a "committment" to spend $6.5 million more. I think most targeted businessmen may have questions about the ability of this plan to yield viable investments.
So what do I think it would take to build a viable start-up league?
Well to start, I believe the toughest bottleneck to get by is locating enough quality owners. I think ideally 12 owners/ownership groups are needed to start a pro football league that will survive. (Potentially it could work with as few as eight, but I strongly suspect the odds of success would decrease a fair amount for each team below 12.)
Spit balling it, given the losses seen by teams in the original USFL (adjusted for today's dollars), you probably need owners who are willing to put up about $10 Million to buy in and potentially lose as much as $30 Million dollars on their teams in operating costs over the 4-5 year period before the teams and the league start to stabilize. (This is obviously a "quick and dirty" educated guess.)
I'd think it would be tough finding 8-12 spring football advocates willing to potentially light $30-$40 million on fire on a gamble.
There is a sales pitch that might work, though. A successful league built upon those lines IMO, would have a chance for those owners to end up with a stable pro team in a stable spring league worth $200-$400M (say 25-40% of an NFL team's value) within about ten years.
While that's a nice return that could be sold to investors, it is still a tough sale as the startup costs are big and as the original USFL proved as few as 1-2 crappy owners (like the original league's J. William Oldenburg, Eddie Einhorn, and Donald Trump proved) can skunk everyone else's efforts and kill the league --- even if the other owners do almost everything right!
With that in mind, I would think you'd be looking for owners (or ownership groups) who are rich, but not Donald Trump or Mark Cuban rich. I am thinking people or groups with net worths in the $350-800 million range. Rich enough to afford the expense; Poor enough to feel a real need to make it work and to religiously stay within the league's financial structure.
And that is the trouble with the new USFL failing quickly. A quick failure of another "competing league" only shrinks that pool of potential investors.
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